Notes on cryptsetup LUKS2 format
- 13 Dec 2017: Post was created (diff)
This is not an exhaustive list of all new features or changes in cryptsetup 2.0.0, just my own notes on the things that matters to me right now. A link to the full upstream changelog in the reference list at the bottom of this page.
- Backwards compatible with luks1 forever
- Integrates with dm-integritycheck for integrity protection with
- Will write a new, random IV, on every write to the disk per-sector metadata as a nonce to the authenticated encryption algorithm (AEAD)
- Journaling will decrease available disk space
- For e.g. SSD’s with integrated integrity checking this feature can be disabled with
- For AEAD:
- Supports aes-xts-plain64 with hmac-sha256 or hmac-sha512 for authentication tag
- aes-gcm-random (native AEAD mode) (Not ready for production due to obvious security flaws)
- ChaCha20 with Poly1305 authenticator
- New memory-hard PBKDF to increase memory cost for known attacks now that it is feasible to run dictionary and brute-force attacks in parallel on GPUs
- Support for Argon2i and Argon2id with the latter preffered for side channel and GPU cracking resistance
- Argon2 is dual licenced under Creative Commons CC0 1.0 and Apache Public License 2.0
- Can use kernel keyring
- to store volume key for dm-crypt where it avoids sending volume key in every device-mapper ioctl structure
- to automatically unlock LUKS device if a passphrase is put into kernel keyring and proper keyring token is configured
- can be used together with TPM
If you have any comments or feedback, please send me an e-mail. (stig at stigok dotcom).
Did you find any typos, incorrect information, or have something to add? Then please propose a change to this post.